exchange rate (RER) and growth performance. Recipient governments face three choices regarding their use of aid: whether to spend or save the aid, how to divide it across sectors, and how to define the currency composition of public saving. RER appreciation will be greater the more governments spend, the larger the share of spending on nontraded goods, and the larger the share of public sector saving in net domestic-currency assets.
As an economywide relative price affecting both inter-and intratemporal expenditure and resource allocation decisions, the RER has a potentially important influence on export growth, export diversification, and economic growth.
1 Large temporary aid inflows may cause domestic spending booms, leading to RER overvaluation and lower growth (Edwards 1989; Cottani, Cavallo, and Kahn 1990; Ghura and Grennes 1993; Razin and Collins 1997; Easterly and Levine 1997; Aguirre and Calderó n 2005) . This result-termed "Dutch disease"-has often been associated with commodity price booms; it may also be observed during postconflict aid surges. 2 The implication of the literature on the effects of resource booms is that postconflict governments receiving aid surges have reasons to be concerned about potential aid-induced RER appreciation, which may reduce competitiveness and growth prospects.
The indirect adverse effect of aid on growth caused by RER overvaluation is one of several channels of transmission from foreign aid to growth.
3 A direct and positive channel of aid is that it embodies access to foreign resources that may lead to higher growth through higher investment, better policies, and aggregate efficiency gains. 4 However, aid is unlikely to increase growth if recipient countries' institutions and policies are weak (in the extreme, growth could decline); aid resources are misspent; or absorptive capabilities of large aid inflows are limited (in the extreme, excessive aid could weaken domestic 1. The RER concept adopted here reflects the economywide price of nontraded goods relative to traded goods. A rise in the ratio leads to an appreciation of the RER, while a fall in the ratio leads to a depreciation of the RER. The RER is considered misaligned when it diverges from its equilibrium level, derived from a behavioral model that accounts for equilibrium in the nontraded goods markets as well as the intertemporal implications of current account sustainability. The RER is characterized as overvalued (undervalued) when it is larger (smaller) than the equilibrium level. The definition and measures of RER misalignment are examined in section III.
2. The traditional literature on Dutch disease deals with the macroeconomic and growth effects of commodity discoveries and price booms. Following the early theoretical work of Van Wijnbergen (1984) and Krugman (1987) , more recent work (Sachs and Warner 1995; Spatafora and Warner 1999) focusses on the empirical evidence of resource booms on resource allocation, corruption and rent-seeking behavior, and growth effects.
3. Another indirect effect of aid on growth could occur if permanently higher aid raises the long-term equilibrium RER and a higher equilibrium RER reduces growth. This link is unconventional, as there is little theoretical and empirical support for the notion that a key relative price at its equilibrium level may hurt growth. An exception is Rodrik (2007) , who provides a theoretical justification linking RER undervaluation to growth.
4. The academic and operational literature on aid effectiveness includes Collier and Hoeffler (2002) ; Addison (2003) ; Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani (2004) ; Kang and Meernik (2004) ; IMF (2005) ; and Schwartz, Halkyard, and Smith (2006). incentives). This would be reflected in a nonmonotonic relation between growth and aid. Aid could interact with third variables in affecting growth. It could have a larger positive growth impact in conflict countries after peace is attained (Collier and Hoeffler 2002) . Aid could also interact negatively with RER misalignment in affecting growth, having an effect beyond its effect on RER misalignment. This article focusses on the impact of large aid flows-a typical postconflict phenomenon-on the RER and economic growth. It addresses the following questions: † What is the time profile of aid, RER misalignment, and growth during the postconflict cycle? † Is postconflict aid associated with disequilibrium RER appreciation? † How serious is RER misalignment in postconflict, and how much of RER misalignment is explained by large postconflict aid flows? † Is growth in postconflict greater than during civil war or in nonconflict countries? † How do aid and RER misalignment affect growth? Is postconflict aid particularly effective in spurring growth?
There are three approaches to assessing the macroeconomic impact of aid. The first identifies the correlations between aid on the one hand and government spending/saving flows and asset stocks on the other. These correlations are not very meaningful, because they are based on budget constraints (not behavioral models) and therefore do not control for other factors, including private sector reactions to and government use of aid.
5 These limitations are overcome by the second approach, based on assessing aid within a fully specified macroeconomic general equilibrium model. The third method is based on specifying behavioral models for individual variables affected by aid-such as the RER and growth-that embody the aforementioned channels of transmission and are consistent with theory. This approach is adopted here.
The article is organized as follows. Section I analyzes the size and timing of postconflict aid during the postconflict cycle, as well as aid-RER misalignmentgrowth correlations, in a sample of 39 postconflict countries. Section II reports estimation results for the RER based on annual 1980-2004 data for a sample of 83 countries. By focussing on the role of aid on long-term RER behavior, this analysis allows measures of RER misalignment to be derived for different subperiods in the pre-and postconflict cycle and for the influence of aid flows on RER overvaluation in postconflicts to be traced. Section III reports estimation results for growth based on a sample of 77 countries and five-year 5. Aiyar, Berg, and Hussain (2005) and IMF (2005) examine the accounting features and qualitative aspects of the macroeconomics of foreign aid. data spanning the period 1970-2004. 6 The growth specification allows testing for the influence of the postconflict cycle, foreign aid, and RER misalignment on growth, controlling for standard growth determinants and allowing for key interactions between postconflict periods, aid, RER misalignment, and financial development. Section IV summarizes the article's main conclusions and draws some policy implications.
This section analyzes the experience of a sample of postconflict aid-recipient countries and, when appropriate, compares these data with those for a control group of developed and developing countries that have not experienced conflict. The sample covers 39 postconflict countries and 44 nonconflict countries, using annual data for 1960-2004. In the many countries that experienced multiple conflicts, all conflicts that ended between 1960 and 2004 are taken into account. The start and end dates of wars are based on the definition of civil war and the data presented in Sambanis (2004) and PRIO (2005) .
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Following Collier and Hoeffler (2002) , three postconflict subperiods are distinguished; in addition a prepeace period (before the end of conflict) is examined to allow for a more comprehensive assessment of the key variables and relations over the full conflict cycle. The conflict cycle is defined as follows, where year 0 indicates the year in which peace is attained: † PrePeace fyr(24), . . . , yr (21)g covers the four conflict years before the year peace begins (if the conflict is ongoing during part of this period, only that part is coded as prepeace). † PeaceOnset fyr(0), yr (1)g covers the first two peaceful years, including the year in which peace is attained (yr(0)). † PostConf1 fyr(2), . . . yr (5)gcovers the four years of peace after the onset of peace (unless another conflict starts, in which case this period accounts only for the peaceful years). † PostConf2 fyr(6), . . . yr (9)gcovers the four consecutive peace years following PostConf1 (unless another conflict starts, in which case this period accounts only for the peaceful years).
The time pattern of three key variables (annual aid flows as a share of GDP, RER misalignment, and per capita real GDP growth) observed in the average 6. The RER model can be estimated only for the shorter period , because the error-correction panel estimation methodology requires almost full data availability. The estimated model can be used to construct indexes of RER equilibrium and RER misalignment for the longer period.
7. Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) provide a list of conflict countries that shows the end date (or dates) of each conflict. conflict country is tracked over the conflict cycle (figures 1 -3). 8 The evidence indicates that postconflict countries receive larger aid shares with the start of peace. Aid peaks early during PeaceOnset, at 11 percent of GDP in the year peace is attained. Aid in PostConf1 remains higher than in the PrePeace period, but it declines during PostConf2 to the PrePeace average of almost 7 percent of GDP.
The RER tends to be undervalued during the period leading to the attainment of peace and overvalued during PeaceOnset and PostConf1, returning close to the equilibrium level in PostConf2. This suggests a lack of large and persistent exchange rate overappreciation in the average postconflict experience. Per capita real GDP growth turns negative the year peace is attained, rising in Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text.
8. The values shown are averages for each year of the conflict cycle (from year -4 to year þ9). Because several countries in the sample experienced more than one conflict, some averages may be generated from more than the 39 cross-sectional units (some countries enter the average more than once). Many countries do not experience the full conflict cycle, either because they fall back into conflict or because the conflict ended less than nine years before 2004. The country sample thus changes for each yearly average. The samples used in figures 1-3 may also differ slightly because of data availability. Sri Lanka, for example, had a year of peace in 2002 and hence did not experience all the years of the conflict cycle. Because RER misalignment data were not available for 2004, the sample generating RER misalignment averages is slightly different from that for aid or growth.
Averages are presented rather than medians because individual observations present large and unstable differences across countries. Median values suggest a similar time profile for all variables over the conflict cycle but exhibit much larger volatility over time. subsequent peace years to levels above those observed during conflict. In PostConf2, however, growth shows a slightly downward trend, suggesting an end of the output recovery during PeaceOnset and PostConf1.
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An event-study approach, reporting fixed-effect estimations of differences in country means between PrePeace and PeaceOnset, PeaceOnset and PostConf1, and PostConf1 and PostConf2 periods, is used to determine the statistical significance of the differences in the three key variables across the different conflict cycle periods (table 1) . 10 It shows that aid is significantly higher (by 3.4 percent of GDP) during PeaceOnset than it is during PrePeace. Aid declines by 2.2 percent of GDP during PostConf1 and by another 2.0 percent in PostConf2. The RER exhibits a temporary trend appreciation between conflict years -4 and þ4 (which is subsequently reversed) (see figure 1) . The statistical tests do not reveal significant differences in RER misalignment between different pairs of conflict periods, however. Growth is not statistically different Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text.
9. The average at time 0 is pulled down by one outlier: the year of conflict end in Rwanda (1994) , when the growth rate was -64 percent. Without Rwanda the average would be -0.3 percent. In the growth regressions this value is not too worrisome, because the model uses five-year averages and the effect is significantly reduced by other, more-normal growth years.
10. Figures 1-3 depict unconditional averages for each conflict cycle year; table 1 reports estimated mean differences between conflict period averages, which are conditional on country fixed effects. The differences between conflict-period averages of the unconditional annual data depicted in figures 1-3 therefore do not match the differences reported in table 1. Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text. Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text.
during PeaceOnset and PrePreace, but a large output recovery in year 1 follows a recession in year 0 when peace is attained. During PostConf1 GDP rises 2.1 percentage points over PeaceOnset, remaining high during PostConf 2. Pairwise comovements of the key variables are examined by measuring correlations for three different country samples: countries that experienced no conflict between 1960 and 2004, countries that experienced conflicts for which data are available for years -4 to -1 (the prepeace years), and countries that experienced conflicts for which data are available for the full peace period (years 0-9). For robustness both cross-section and panel correlations for each country group are reported (table 2) .
Aid and RER misalignment are not significantly correlated in most cases, and they are never positively and significantly correlated. This provides simple, unconditional evidence against generalized exchange-rate overvaluation associated with aid. The simple correlation between aid and growth is negative and significant in most cases, suggesting at least that the relation between aid and growth is not unambiguously positive. Growth and RER misalignment are Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text.
negatively and significantly correlated only during the peace years in conflict countries, hinting that RER overvaluation could undermine output recovery during peace years. This evidence is illustrative but should be taken with much care. Simple associations are not informative about causality (which could run either or both ways), do not consider the influence of other variables, and do not reflect nonmonotonic relations and interactions with third variables. To overcome these limitations, one needs to test the relations among the three key variables in a multivariate framework, based on behavioral equations that address dynamics, third variables, reverse causality, nonlinearities, and interactions. This is the task of the next two sections.
The concept of RER equilibrium most commonly used in the literature is based on a single-equation reduced-form behavioral model that accounts for current account flow variables as well as factors influencing longer-run stock equilibrium (see, for example, Edwards 1989; Elbadawi 1994; Elbadawi and Soto 1997a, b; Baffes, Elbadawi, and O'Connell 1999; Clark and MacDonald 1999; and Edwards and Savastano 1999) . The underlining notion of RER equilibrium in this approach is intertemporal, as the path of the equilibrium RER is influenced not only by the current value of fundamental determinants but also by expectations about the future evolution of these variables.
An empirical model for the RER that is a close version of the micro-founded general equilibrium RER model developed by Elbadawi and Soto (2005) is specified and estimated here. This model reflects the influence of standard RER fundamentals, including aid, as reflected by the following equation: where subscripts i and t represent country and time indexes; b 0i is the countryspecific intercept; TOT is the terms of trade; PROD is the ratio of per capita income in country i to the average in OECD countries (a proxy for sector productivity differences); OPEN is a measure of trade openness (computed as the residual from a regression of trade as a share of GDP on geographic variables); GOV is the share of government consumption in GDP; TAX is the share of taxes on nontraded goods in GDP; AID is the GDP share of foreign aid net of changes in foreign exchange reserves; NFI is the share of net foreign income in GDP; and 1 it is a disturbance term.
The expected signs of RER determinants, noted below the corresponding variables in equation 1, are consistent with theory and earlier studies. The model predicts the equilibrium RER to be higher with better terms of trade, higher productivity in the traded goods sector relative to the nontraded sector, less trade openness, higher government consumption, higher taxes on nontraded goods, more aid, and larger net foreign income.
An error-correction version of equation 1 is estimated for a panel comprising annual data for 83 countries (including 36 postconflict countries) for 1980-2004. 11 (Data definitions and sources are reported in the appendix.) Three econometric estimation methods appropriate for an error-correction specification are applied to the panel data: pooled mean group, mean group, and dynamic fixed-effects estimators.
12 The pooled mean group estimator imposes the restriction that all countries share the long-run coefficients; the more general mean group model assumes that economies differ in their short-and long-run parameters. The pooled mean group estimator is more general than the dynamic fixed-effects estimator, which assumes that all parameters are constant across countries, except for the intercept, which is allowed to vary across countries. The choice between the three estimators entails a tradeoff between consistency and efficiency. The dynamic fixed-effects estimator dominates the other two in terms of efficiency if the restrictions are valid. 13 If they are not valid, the dynamic fixed-effects will generate inconsistent estimates and be dominated by the pooled mean group and mean group estimates. For this study the pooled mean group offers the best compromise between consistency and efficiency, because one would expect the long-run path of the RER to be driven by a similar process across countries while the short-run dynamics around the long-run equilibrium path may differ from one country to another because they are likely to be driven by idiosyncratic news and shocks to fundamentals.
11. Unlike section II, in which the sample comprises only postconflict countries, section III presents the results of an empirical estimation of the equilibrium RER for both postconflict and peaceful countries. The country sample size and period coverage are therefore determined by availability of time series data. Every country must have at least 20 annual observations in order to be included; data are missing for many countries before 1980.
12. Recent literature (for example, Pesaran, Shin, and Smith 1999) shows that the existence of a long-run relationship in equation 1 is not contingent on cointegration. Because right-hand-side variables can combine stationary and nonstationary variables, the equation can be embedded in a dynamic error-correction model. Pooled mean group estimation hence does not require pretesting for unit roots and cointegration. All variables in equation 1 were constructed as index numbers, trend deviations, or shares, implying that they are stationary in the long run.
13. The mean group estimator is derived from the fully heterogeneous coefficient model, which imposes no cross-country parameter restrictions and can be estimated on a country-by-country basis, provided that the time-series dimension of the data is sufficiently large. When the cross-country dimension is also large, the mean of short-and long-run coefficients across countries can be consistently estimated by the unweighted average of the individual country coefficients, which is the mean group estimator proposed by Pesaran, Smith, and Im (1996) . TAB L E 3 . Short-and Long-Run Determinants of RER, 1980 RER, -2004 DX t ¼ X t 2 X t21 Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text.
Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Schmidt-Hebbel
The restriction of the pooled mean group against the mean group model can be tested by performing Hausman tests (table 3) . The null hypothesis of equality of coefficients cannot be rejected at the 1 percent level, except for productivity and foreign aid (net of international reserves), for which the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 10 percent level. This evidence favors the pooled mean group model against the mean group estimator. The dynamic fixed-effects results confirm in part those obtained by the pooled mean group estimator. However, for the reason discussed above, the pooled mean group is favored over the dynamic fixed-effects method. The rest of the discussion therefore focusses on the pooled mean group findings.
The pooled mean group results are consistent with those reported in other studies.
14 All long-run coefficient estimates are highly significant (at the 1 and 5 percent significance levels) and display the expected signs. With respect to the speed of adjustment and the short-term elasticities, the pooled mean group results suggest that several fundamentals (the terms of trade, relative productivity, and net foreign income) have highly significant short-run effects on the RER. The estimated adjustment parameter (20.20) is equal to that obtained by Edwards (1989) using a partial adjustment model for 12 developing countries. The adjustment parameter estimate reported here implies that the half-life of an RER deviation from equilibrium is about three years. This finding is consistent with the three-to five-year consensus range of international estimates of the half-life of deviations of the RER from purchasing power parity (Rogoff 1996; Cashin and McDermott 2003) .
The results show that higher long-term foreign aid (net of international reserve accumulation) contributes significantly to RER appreciation. 15 In contrast, short-term changes in aid do not have significant effects on the short-term behavior of the RER in preliminary results obtained for the three methods. Aid was therefore omitted from the short-run variables included in the results reported in table 3.
Based on the model results and the results of Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Soto (2006) , indexes can be constructed for the equilibrium RER (ERER) and RER misalignment. The ERER index is obtained from the estimated model using permanent components of the fundamental RER determinants (estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott procedure) substituted into the estimated RER equation. The permanent components of the fundamentals are characterized as sustainable levels and are therefore consistent with the concept of RER equilibrium. The ERER index is normalized (through the country-specific intercept) so that 14. Comparable findings in the literature include Chinn (1997) for productivity; Elbadawi and Soto (1997b) and Drine and Rault (2004) for the terms of trade; Elbadawi and Soto (1997b) and Maeso-Fernandez, Osbat, and Schnatz (2002) for government consumption; and Elbadawi and Soto (2005) for most variables.
15. Gross foreign aid (without deducting reserve accumulation) is a less robust determinant of the RER than aid net of accumulation of reserves. This finding confirms that whether aid is spent or saved affects the behavior of the RER. the average RER misalignment (the mean logarithmic difference between the RER and ERER for each country) is set equal to zero. The log of the resulting normalized ERER is then subtracted from the log of the RER to obtain the RER misalignment time series for each country.
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Setting the average RER misalignment at zero for the full 25-year sample period imposes the plausible identification condition that no country is allowed to exhibit RER misalignment for the full 25-year sample period. This identification restriction is justified by the long-term equilibrium model for the RER, which nests temporary RER disequilibria with a reported half-life of three years. This relatively rapid correction of temporary RER misalignments suggests that several episodes of RER over-and undervaluation are likely to be observed over the 25-year sample period in any country.
The average RER misalignment and its decomposition according to the contribution of the deviations of fundamentals from their trend values and of short-term dynamics are reported in table 4. The results are based on the methodology discussed above applied to the pooled mean group results for the RER equation presented in the first column of table 3. Observed RER misalignment (column 1) is broken down into two components: RER disequilibrium caused by the deviation of fundamentals from their long-term trends (column 2) and RER disequilibrium caused by short-term shocks in fundamentals (labeled "error correction term," column 6). The combined contribution of deviations of fundamentals from long- Structural variables are terms of trade, productivity, net foreign income/GDP, and aid net of international reserve accumulation as a share of GDP.
Source: Authors' analysis based on data described in the text.
16. Elbadawi, Kaltani, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) provide a detailed description of the methodology for computing RER equilibrium levels and misalignment measures. term trends is divided into the contribution of the three policy fundamentals (column 3) and the four structural fundamentals (columns 4 and 5).
The RER misalignment estimates suggest that the average conflict country exhibited a moderately undervalued (-5.8 percent) exchange rate during PrePeace. After peace was attained, the average postconflict country experienced an RER overvaluation of 7.8 percent during PeaceOnset, which declined to 2.5 percent during PostConf1. During PostConf2 the RER became undervalued again (by -4.7 percent).
It is not surprising that short-term changes in fundamentals (reflected by the error correction term) explain most of the deviations from equilibrium RER levels. With the sole exception of the PrePeace period, deviations of fundamentals from their long-term trend levels contribute little to RER misalignment in each conflict-cycle period. Among the seven fundamentals, aid deviations from trend values contribute particularly little to misalignment, explaining only 0.1 percentage points of the observed RER undervaluation of 2.8 percent and 0.3 percentage points of the observed RER overvaluation of 7.8 percent during PrePeace (PeaceOnset) period and even less in the subsequent postconflict periods. The minor contribution of aid to RER disequilibrium over the conflict cycle results from two factors: the small to moderate changes in aid observed over the conflict cycle (documented in section I) and the relatively small magnitude of the long-run coefficient of aid in the RER estimation (reported in table 3).
I I I . G R O W T H D U R I N G T H E P O S T C O N F L I C T C Y C L E
A general result from the cross-country econometric research on aid effectiveness is that aid does not influence economic performance, at least not unambiguously. Some research (World Bank 1998; Burnside and Dollar 2000) shows that aid to countries with good policy environments may increase growth but that its effect is subject to diminishing returns. In evaluating government use of aid, Barder (2006) notes that limits on aid absorption may explain why the costs of aid increase faster than its benefits. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) find that aid is more effective in postconflict transition than in normal peaceful environments. Roodman (2007) , who tests the robustness of empirical studies on the effect of aid on growth, concludes that most results appear fragile to changes in model specification, especially sample expansion.
A strand of the empirical growth literature that focusses on the impact of RER misalignment finds a robust negative association between RER overvaluation and growth. While moderate undervaluation may support growth, extreme undervaluation may reduce it (Razin and Collins 1997; Aguirre and Calderó n 2005) . This literature also finds that the growth impact of RER overvaluation and volatility depends on the level of financial development, with overvaluation generally reducing growth in countries with low levels of financial development while having no significant effect in financially advanced economies (Aghion and others 2006) . An empirical growth model is specified here that nests the four strands of the growth literature relevant to postconflict growth-conflict periods, aid, RER competitiveness, and financial development-as well as their possible interactions. Controlling for conventional growth determinants that are robustly identified in the empirical cross-country growth literature, the model addresses the following questions, which have not been addressed in the aid and postconflict transition literature: † What are the separate effects of peace and postconflict periods, aid, RER misalignment, and financial development on growth? † Does aid reduce or augment the impact of RER misalignment on growth? † Does aid increase the contribution of postconflict peace to growth? † Is the growth loss from RER misalignment ameliorated by financial development?
To answer these questions, the following growth model is specified and estimated for five-year periods:
where i and t are country and time indexes; y is per capita GDP growth; A is aid as a share of GDP; 17 RERMIS is RER misalignment; PeaceOnset, PostConf1, and PostConf2 are the postconflict period dummy variables; 18 FD 17. Aid is measured at the beginning of each five-year period, as recipient countries tend to absorb and spend aid with some time lag. Start-of-period aid is also more likely to be exogenous, because aid is partially responsive to recipient countries' past economic performance, including past growth. Aid is set at zero for developed countries.
18. Defining the three postconflict periods in the growth sample, which consists of five-year averages, calls for some discretion. The rule of thumb used here was to code a period in accordance with the number of years in each group (PeaceOnset, PostConf1, PostConf2) that has a majority. When a five-year period consists of one year of war, two years of PeaceOnset, and 2 years of PostConf1, for example, the period is coded as PeaceOnset. A five-year period that consists of two years of war, two years of PeaceOnset, and one year of PostConf1 is coded as PeaceOnset.
is a measure of financial development; CV is a set of standard control variables that are robustly associated with cross-country growth (initial per capita GDP, initial per capita GDP cyclical component, inflation, government expenditure as a share of GDP, human capital investment as a share of GDP, a rule of law index, and trade openness);
19 and m t and h i are time and country fixed effects. For the individual variables the expected signs of the coefficients of growth determinants, noted below the corresponding variables in equation 2, are consistent with theory and earlier studies. The interaction effect between aid and RER misalignment (or overvaluation) on growth could have either sign, depending on the relative allocation of aid to traded and nontraded sector activities and on sector differences between rates of return during periods of RER overvaluation. Growth effects of interactions between aid and the three postconflict period dummy variables could also go either way, depending on the country-specific scarcity of funds and absorptive capacity of aid. Finally, one would expect a positive growth effect from the interaction between RER misalignment and financial development, because financial markets are more likely to supply bank loans and hedging instruments (such as foreign exchange derivatives) when they are deeper, ameliorating the negative direct impact of RER overvaluation.
Policy fundamentals are likely to be jointly determined with growth and responsive to expected future growth performance. The generalized method of moments system dynamic panel estimation method is therefore used, in order to properly account for endogeneity and country-specific unobserved characteristics. This system (developed in Arellano and Bover 1995 and Blundell and Bond 1997) uses lagged values of the dependent and independent variables as instruments and combines regressions in differences with regressions in levels to better address the issue of weak instrumentation. Under the assumed moment conditions, the generalized method of moments system accounts for the combined problems of potential endogeneity and unobserved country effects.
The data panel comprises 77 countries, including both conflict and nonconflict developing economies as well as industrial countries, for five-year nonoverlapping averages spanning . The regression and model consistency test results are reported in table 5. The first column reports the results of estimating equation 2 excluding interaction terms; the second column reports the results using the full specification, including interaction terms; the third column reports a more parsimonious regression that excludes nonsignificant variables. Both the Sargan tests for overidentifying restrictions and the serial-correlation tests for error terms, reported at the bottom of table 5, validate the specification. Six of the seven standard growth fundamentals exhibit the expected sign and are statistically very significant in the three regression results (the exception is trade openness, which is dropped in the last regression).
19. Loayza and Soto (2002) provide a comprehensive review of the evidence on the empirical relevance of these standard growth correlates. The baseline regression results reported in column 1 show that aid is positively but nonmonotonically associated with growth. The positive and significant effect of the linear aid term is increasingly offset by the negative and significant quadratic aid term, implying declining marginal growth returns of aid. RER misalignment (appreciation) has a significant negative effect on growth. There is evidence of a direct peace dividend for growth in PostConf1 but neither before (in PeaceOnset) nor after (in PostConf2). In fact, growth declines significantly in PostConf2. This strong result suggests that there is significant but temporary catch-up growth some years after peace is attained but that growth subsequently relapses to prepeace levels, after controlling for all other growth determinants. Financial development has a small and significant but negative effect on growth; subsequent results overturn this result, however.
The full specification in column 2 allows for key interaction terms among variables. Signs, sizes, and significance levels of the coefficients of individual variables of interest (the first seven variables in table 5) are similar to those reported in column 1. The one important difference is financial development, which now exhibits a positive and significant contribution to growth.
While a priori the interaction term between RER misalignment and aid could have either sign, it is empirically found to have a negative and significant effect on growth. Therefore aid reduces growth in a macroeconomic environment of exchange rate misalignment (overvaluation), controlling for its other effects captured in this specification. The negative impact of RER misalignment (both directly and when interacted with aid) is ameliorated by financial development, as demonstrated by the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction between RER misalignment and financial development. Aid has a positive impact on growth when disbursed during the three postconflict periods, reflected by the corresponding interaction effects between aid and period dummies; however, its effect is significant at the 5 percent level only during PostConf1.
For robustness purposes, a parsimonious version of the estimation equation (reported in column 3) removes several variables that were not robustly significant in columns 1 and 2. Significance levels and coefficient sizes of single or direct effects of several variables of interest are reinforced under this specification. The negative interaction between RER misalignment and aid is more significant, while the positive interaction between RER misalignment and financial development is smaller.
These results provide robust evidence on the questions posed at the beginning of this section. Growth is significantly higher in PostConf1 and significantly lower in PostConf2. Aid affects growth positively, but its effect is characterized by diminishing returns. RER misalignment has a detrimental effect on growth. Financial development contributes positively to growth.
The effects of individual variables of interest to postconflict growth (complemented by the contributions of six other standard robust growth determinants) are extended by interaction effects between key variables. There is some evidence that aid disbursed after attainment of peace has higher growth returns, but the evidence is not entirely robust. There is, however, significant evidence that the interaction of RER misalignment and aid has a negative effect on growth. This may reflect the fact that more aid contributes more strongly to nontraded activities with lower growth returns. The level of aid also contributes to RER appreciation, and its deviation from trend contributes marginally to RER misalignment, as documented in section II. Hence, there is also a small direct effect of aid on RER misalignment, which strengthens the interaction effect on growth. The fact that the interaction between RER misalignment and financial development has a positive effect on growth may confirm the notion that deeper financial markets provide better protection to (traded-goods) firms against RER overvaluation.
The results of column 3 can be used to probe more deeply into the analysis of the impact of RER misalignment on growth. From equation 2 the overall growth effect of a change in RER misalignment is given by the following expression:
where b 2 is the direct effect of RER misalignment on growth and b 7 A and b 11 FD are the nonlinear effects of RER misalignment on growth that depend on the levels of aid and financial development. The estimated parameters imply that a one standard deviation increase in RER misalignment (that is, a one standard deviation RER appreciation for a given RER equilibrium level) leads to a 0.35 percent decline in economic growth. In addition, if aid and financial development are held at their median sample values, the indirect growth effects from the interactions between RER misalignment and the levels of aid and financial development lead to an additional growth loss of 0.2 percent and a growth gain of 0.4 percent.
Many postconflict countries are highly dependent on aid and have shallow financial markets. Two simple simulation exercises are conducted, based on the regression result, to reflect this reality and obtain more-relevant results. For the first exercise the effects of a one standard deviation increase in RER misalignment on growth are simulated at different levels of aid dependency. Second, the effects of a one standard deviation increase in RER misalignment on growth are estimated at different levels of financial development.
For the first exercise, three levels of aid-the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the distribution of aid among developing countries in the sample-are examined, holding the level of financial development at its median sample value (table 6). High aid levels can be the most detrimental to growth in the presence of RER overvaluation. Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Uganda experienced aid levels at or above the 75th percentile. The level of aid plays a major role in the growth impact of RER misalignment: growth declines by 0.02 percent under a low-aid scenario and 0.53 percent under a high-aid scenario. Growth reduction would be even larger in many highly aid-dependent countries, where aid represents close to 20 percent of GDP.
For the second exercise the growth impact of the same increase in RER misalignment is estimated at different levels of financial development while holding aid at its median sample value for developing countries. Postconflict countries differ widely in their financial market development. Many African countries have very shallow financial markets, as captured by the ratio of private credit to GDP. The Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guatemala, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, and Uganda experienced financial development levels at or below the 25th percentile. For 2000-04, financial development in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Tanzania is lower than that of the sample's 25th percentile, while it is close to that of the 75th percentile in Egypt and Morocco. The results suggest that financial development mitigates some of the detrimental effects of overvaluation. Growth in countries in the 75th percentile in financial market development declines 0.10 percent as a result of a one standard deviation increase in RER misalignment. In contrast, growth falls 0.23 percent in countries in the 25th percentile in response to the same increase in RER overvaluation. This figure may seem relatively small, but when considering the unique features of postconflict countries-which have greater variation in RER misalignment and less financial development than other countries-the repercussions on growth are substantially larger. In the Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, or Niger, for example, the decline in growth from RER disequilibrium appreciation could be as high as 0.5 percent. Financial sector reform could both foster economic development directly and make growth more resilient to RER overvaluation. Note: A low level of any variable represents the 25th percentile of the distribution of aid or financial development in the sample of developing countries; a medium level, the 50th percentile; and a high level, the 75th percentile.
I V. C O N C L U S I O N S
New empirical evidence on the time pattern and behavior of foreign aid, the RER, and growth suggests that aid rises significantly when peace is attained in the average conflict country but declines in the postconflict years. The RER shifts from being undervalued during civil war to being overvalued in the first few years of peace and returning to equilibrium thereafter, but these changes are not statistically significant. Per capita GDP growth rises significantly after the year peace is attained and for the full postconflict period.
Simple correlations-performed separately for nonconflict and conflict countries-reveal several patterns of associations among these variables. Aid and RER misalignment (or overvaluation) are not positively and significantly correlated, providing prima facie evidence against exchange rate overvaluation when the level of aid is high. The simple correlation between aid and growth is negative and significant in most cases, suggesting that the relation between aid and growth is not positive. Growth and RER misalignment are negatively and significantly correlated only during the peace years in conflict countries, hinting that RER overvaluation could undermine output recovery during peace years.
Simple correlations may be highly misleading, however, because they are not informative about causality, do not control for third variables, and do not consider nonmonotonic relations and interactions with other variables. For these reasons this study focusses on the behavior of the RER and growth in a multivariate framework, identifying their response to variables, particularly aid, that are crucial during the conflict cycle.
The RER misalignment data are generated from error-correction estimations for the equilibrium RER, based on structural determinants, including foreign aid. The empirical results for the model-based on a sample of annual 1980-2004 data for 83 countries-show that long-run coefficients of all structural variables and short-run coefficients of some structural variables are significant and display the signs predicted by theory. Higher long-term foreign aid contributes significantly to long-term RER appreciation; short-term changes in aid do not have significant effects on short-run RER behavior.
Regression results are used to compute RER misalignment series for each country and for the average conflict country over the four periods of its conflict cycle. RER misalignment is decomposed based on short-term dynamics and the contribution of deviations of fundamentals from their long-term trends. Not surprisingly, short-term shocks explain most of the RER deviations from equilibrium levels. Deviations of fundamentals from their long-term trend levels contribute little to RER misalignment in each conflict-cycle period. Aid deviations from trend values contribute particularly little to misalignment.
This empirical evidence on growth provides new insights into the pattern of growth following conflict and the role of key determinants of postconflict growth (conflict periods, aid, RER misalignment, and financial development), both individually and through their interactions. The growth equation nests these variables within a standard specification, controlling for growth fundamentals that are robustly identified in the empirical growth literature.
Empirical estimations, based on the dynamic system generalized method of moments estimator, were performed on a panel sample of 77 conflict and nonconflict countries for five-year averages spanning 1970-2004. The results indicate that aid initially contributes positively to growth but reduces growth (as captured by a quadratic specification) at higher levels, confirming declining growth returns to aid. RER misalignment (overvaluation) reduces growth. Some years after peace, a peace dividend is attained, but it turns negative at the end of the postconflict cycle.
These results are complemented by important interaction effects. There is some evidence that aid disbursed after attainment of peace promotes higher growth than during conflict or at the very end of the postconflict period. Other interaction effects suggest that the negative growth impact of RER misalignment is intensified by aid and weakened by financial development. Hence aid reduces growth in a macroeconomic environment that allows for RER overvaluation. Deeper financial markets provide better protection to (traded-goods) firms against RER overvaluation, possibly by supplying more credit or offering hedging instruments against RER risk.
These results provide empirical support for several channels of transmission from aid to growth. The linear positive effect of aid on growth supports the notion that recipient countries with access to foreign resources are likely to use aid to finance investment, improve policies, and raise aggregate efficiency. The negative nonlinear effect shows that aid has decreasing growth benefits, reflecting the growing misuse of or weakening capabilities of absorbing larger aid inflows. By showing that very little postconflict RER appreciation can be traced to exceptionally large aid inflows, the results suggest that aid has no indirect negative effect on growth through RER misalignment, an effect that is potentially very relevant to postconflict countries. Postconflict aid thus does not appear to contribute to Dutch disease-type RER misalignment and lower growth. Aid does interact with other variables in affecting growth: the timing of aid matters, with aid reducing growth when it interacts with RER overvaluation.
These results lead to some policy inferences for the management of aid and the conduct of macroeconomic and structural policies in the years following the attainment of peace. Peaks of aid inflows at peace onset and shortly thereafter should be avoided. Spreading aid commitments out over time brings actual aid flows closer to permanent aid flows, so that spending aid is more consistent with permanent aid resources. Building up the quality of policies and institutions is a gradual process after the onset of peace. To maximize effectiveness, aid flows should also increase gradually. Avoiding excessive government spending raises growth both directly and indirectly (by reducing RER overvaluation). These findings suggest the need to strengthen international competitiveness through appropriate macroeconomic policies.
In the realm of structural policies the results suggest that financial development and deepening have direct positive effects on long-term growth and an additional growth bonus by reducing the adverse growth impact of RER overvaluation. Hence financial development should be high on the priority of postconflict policies. This could include strengthening domestic banking, supporting the development of domestic capital markets, and promoting the development of financial instruments to protect against exchange rate risk. 
